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IN DEFENSE OF (CIRCUIT) COURT-PACKING 
Xiao Wang* 
INTRODUCTION 
Proposals to pack the Supreme Court have gained steam recently. Presi-
dential candidate Pete Buttigieg endorsed a court-packing plan at the start of 
his campaign,1 and several other candidates also indicated a willingness to 
consider such a plan, including Senators Elizabeth Warren and Amy 
Klobuchar.2 Legal scholars have similarly called upon Congress to increase 
the size of the Supreme Court,3 particularly following the heated confirma-
tions of Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh.4 These suggestions for 
Court reform have only gotten more pronounced with the recent passing of 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the subsequent nomination of Judge Amy Co-
ney Barrett, and the approach of November’s general election.5 
This discussion, however, overlooks a more feasible yet equally impact-
ful proposal: increasing the number of federal circuit court judgeships. Alt-
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 1. David A. Graham, The Democrats Discover the Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (June 4, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/buttigiegs-supreme-court-plan-and
-democratic-party/590905/ [https://perma.cc/Q6MA-MPSW]. 
 2. Would You Support Adding Justices to ‘Pack’ the Supreme Court?, WASH. POST, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/policy-2020/voting-changes/supreme-
court-packing/ [https://perma.cc/QZ6K-ZYFE]. 
 3. See Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 
148, 175–77 (2019); Michael Klarman, Why Democrats Should Pack the Supreme Court, TAKE 
CARE (Oct. 15, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/why-democrats-should-pack-the-
supreme-court [https://perma.cc/P969-9DJC]. 
 4. For an analytical perspective on the unprecedented and procedurally countermajori-
tarian nature of the Gorsuch and Kavanaugh appointments, see Xiao Wang, Increasingly Anti-
democratic? An Empirical Examination of the Supreme Court Nomination and Confirmation 
Process, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 242 (2020), https://www.californialawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/Wang_Increasingly_Antidemocratic_CalifLRevOnline_Vol11.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QNV8-PKPE]. 
 5. See, e.g., Astead W. Herndon & Maggie Astor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Death Revives 
Talk of Court Packing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09
/19/us/politics/what-is-court-packing.html [https://perma.cc/QV6K-BRZV]; Quinta Jurecic & 
Susan Hennessey, The Reckless Race to Confirm Amy Coney Barrett Justifies Court Packing, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 4, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/skeptic-case-
court-packing/616607/ [https://perma.cc/GV4P-B24J]. 
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hough many see the Supreme Court as having the final word on the law,6 it is 
circuit courts that are actually the last resort for most litigants. In the mine-
run case, their jurisdiction is mandatory—a civil litigant or criminal defend-
ant that loses in district court can seek review before their regional circuit 
court of appeal as a matter of right, and the circuit court must thereafter is-
sue a decision.7 On the other hand, Supreme Court review is typically discre-
tionary. Of the thousands of certiorari petitions filed, the Court hears only 
about eighty cases a year, making plenary review of most issues impossible.8 
Members of the Court have all but admitted this fact. As the late Justice 
Ginsburg acknowledged, the Court is not a “super appellate court” designed 
to “error-correct[]”: it “couldn’t manage [that] workload” and will therefore 
“step in only when the law needs clarification.”9 
I want to use this piece to make three arguments. First, that circuit 
courts matter—that, in fact, they matter much more than the Supreme Court 
on many issues. Second, that there are sound, nonpartisan reasons for in-
creasing the number of circuit judges today. And third, that, whatever the 
outcome of November’s general election, it is possible to expand the circuit 
courts in a manner that supplies necessary judicial resources while also pro-
moting democratic accountability. 
I. WHY DO CIRCUIT COURTS MATTER? 
Circuit court decisions often represent the final word on issues of federal 
law. The most commonly invoked reason behind this phenomenon is the 
capacity constraint: that is, the Supreme Court simply cannot review every 
case. Although the number of certiorari petitions has increased, the number 
of cases granted has stayed constant—between sixty and 100—over the past 
twenty-five years.10 The Supreme Court may want to promote legal uni-
formity, but it (and we) must accept a high degree of dis-uniformity in the 
 
 6. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are not final 
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”). 
 7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals 
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .”). 
 8. See Supreme Court Procedure, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com
/reference/educational-resources/supreme-court-procedure/ [https://perma.cc/25S8-4VCV] 
(“Of the 7,000 to 8,000 cert petitions filed each term, the court grants certiorari and hears oral 
argument in only about 80.”); see also Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Su-
preme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1244 (2012) (“Congress [has] 
passed legislation . . . remov[ing] virtually all of the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, leaving 
Justices free to select the cases they wish[] to hear.”). 
 9. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Just., Remarks at CUNY School of Law (Mar. 11, 2004), in 7 
N.Y. CITY L. REV. 221, 237 (2004). 
 10. Supreme Court Caseloads, 1880–2015, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history
/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/supreme-court-caseloads-1880-2015 [https://perma.cc/M2FK-
FZ8Y]; Final Stat Pack for October Term 2019, SCOTUSBLOG 31–32 (2020), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Final-Statpack-7.20.2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RGG2-T3W2]. 
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legal system. Unresolved circuit splits abound.11 Such splits touch on almost 
every area of the law, from immigration,12 to eminent domain,13 to search 
and seizure,14 to discrimination,15 to cybersecurity,16 and so on. As Deborah 
Beim and Kelly Rader have observed, most of these “intercircuit splits are 
never resolved by the Supreme Court.”17 In fact, “[o]nly one-third are re-
solved,” leaving “numerous contemporaneous, growing splits” unresolved.18 
In addition to such discrete splits, the Supreme Court has also increas-
ingly employed tools that devolve power back to the circuits. These tools 
may not necessarily create a formal split in any single case, but they do pro-
vide leeway so that the circuit court functionally has the last word on most 
matters. Consider, for example, the increased use of balancing tests over cat-
egorical rules in Supreme Court case law.19 Whatever the merit of any par-
ticular balancing test, the long-term effect of instituting such tests is to 
confer deference to the lower courts applying the tests. 
By its nature, a balancing test sets forth a number of factors to evaluate. 
A lower court can generally weigh such factors in whatever way it chooses, 
and it can always rebalance the factors differently and come out another way 
 
 11. See, e.g., Current Circuit Splits, 14 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 279 (2018); Circuit Splits, 
MARQ. UNIV. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG, https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/category/circuit-splits/ 
[https://perma.cc/BV9N-SSWX]. 
 12. United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting a circuit split on 
whether aliens have a constitutional right to be informed of discretionary relief from deporta-
tion). 
 13. ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 182 (2015) (“[F]ederal and state courts have been all over the map in 
their efforts to apply Kelo’s strictures against ‘pretextual’ takings” with “no consensus in 
sight.”). 
 14. Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth 
Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1155–56 (2012) (noting the “persistence of Fourth 
Amendment circuit splits”). 
 15. Clemens v. Centurylink Inc., 874 F.3d 1113, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2017) (acknowledg-
ing circuit split between Ninth Circuit and D.C. Circuit on the form of remedies available for 
Title VII discrimination). 
 16. In re U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 58 (D.C. Cir. 
2019) (splitting with the Third and Fourth Circuits on standard plaintiffs must satisfy to assert 
data breach claims). 
 17. Deborah Beim & Kelly Rader, Legal Uniformity in American Courts, 16 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 448, 449 (2019). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 605 (1988) 
(charting increased use of balancing tests from mostly zero to one Supreme Court cases per 
term in 1960s and 1970s to double-digit cases by late 1980s); Jonathan R. Nash, Aiming for 
Simplicity, Supreme Court Makes Things More Complicated, HILL (July 13, 2016, 9:43 AM), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/287520-aiming-for-simplicity-supreme-
court-opts-for-complexity [https://perma.cc/4VM6-SXCU] (discussing use of balancing tests 
in more recent Supreme Court terms). 
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in a future case.20 This entire process (intentionally or unintentionally) dis-
courages Supreme Court review. After all, the Court is reluctant to second-
guess how a lower court weighs, balances, or applies facts to factors, because 
doing so would be classic error correction, which is not the Court’s busi-
ness.21 
Finally, aside from capacity constraints and efforts to devolve power, the 
discretionary nature of Supreme Court review gives the Court a chance to 
pass on even the most pressing legal issues. As Rule 10 of the Supreme Court 
Rules states, “[r]eview on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of 
judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for 
compelling reasons.”22 What constitutes “compelling” is in the eye of the be-
holder. The Court, for instance, recently declined to grant certiorari on sev-
eral qualified immunity cases, including cases concerning excessive force by 
police—notwithstanding nationwide protests on the matter.23 Even con-
servative outlets described these cases as “fractured decisions” in an area be-
set by “legal, practical, and moral infirmities.”24 Declining review here only 
underscores the importance of federal circuit courts: for now and the future, 
they are the final arbiters regarding what official conduct is and is not pro-
tected by qualified immunity. 
The above reasons both reinforce and magnify the extraordinary trans-
formation of the federal circuit courts that has taken place over the past sev-
eral years. The Senate has confirmed fifty-three circuit judges during 
President Donald Trump’s tenure—just two shy of the number of circuit 
judges President Barack Obama appointed over eight years.25 To be sure, 
 
 20. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 
943, 972 (1987) (“A frequent criticism of balancing is that the Court has no objective criteria 
for valuing or comparing the interests at stake.”). 
 21. See Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 237. 
 22. SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 23. E.g., Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1862 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari). 
 24. Robert Barnes & Ann E. Marimow, Supreme Court Refuses to Reconsider Immunity 
that Shields Police Accused of Brutality, WASH. POST (June 15, 2020, 11:58 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-refuses-to-reconsider-
immunity-that-shields-police-accused-of-brutality/2020/06/15/1cfc444c-ae7f-11ea-8f56-
63f38c990077_story.html [https://perma.cc/LCM3-L8P3]; Jay Schweikert, Two Recent En Banc 
Decisions Exemplify the Injustice, Impracticality, and Persistent Confusion Inherent to Qualified 
Immunity, CATO INST. (Aug. 22, 2019, 2:35 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/two-recent-en-
banc-decisions-exemplify-injustice-impracticality-persistent-confusion-inherent 
[https://perma.cc/88UB-GLJC] (discussing split between Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 
2019) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Hunter v. Cole, No. 19-753, 2020 WL 3146695 (U.S June 
15, 2020) (mem.), and Kelsay v. Ernst, 933 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert. denied 140 
S. Ct. 2760 (2020) (mem.)). 
 25. Leigh Ann Caldwell & Sahil Kapur, McConnell Reaches Milestone on Judges by Fill-
ing Final Circuit Court Vacancy, NBC NEWS (June 24, 2020, 12:37 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/mcconnell-reaches-milestone-judges-filling-final-
circuit-court-vacancy-n1232011 [https://perma.cc/ZGM2-MBKH]; Carl Hulse, McConnell 
36 Michigan Law Review Online [Vol. 119:32 
President Obama did nominate more than fifty-five circuit judges. But 
“[d]uring Obama’s last two years as president, the McConnell-led Senate 
majority confirmed the fewest judges in more than half a century, including 
only two [circuit] court judges.”26 That blockade lifted after President 
Trump’s election. Because of the sheer volume of newly appointed judges, 
seven circuits now have more Republican than Democratic appointees: the 
Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh.27 The volume of 
these appointments has already reverberated through a number of en banc 
decisions which, by their nature, definitively set the law for the circuit at is-
sue. 
In United States v. Christian,28 for instance, the Sixth Circuit upheld a 
search warrant issued on a suspect’s home for illegal drugs. On the surface, 
probable cause was—in the majority’s view—“not a close call.”29 The search 
warrant was five pages long, supported by surveillance of the property, and 
backed by information from a confidential informant.30 It was directed at the 
home of an individual with several prior drug convictions.31 
But the dissent refuted each of these points. As it noted, the search war-
rant was not really five pages long. The substantive allegations were confined 
to a single page, with the remaining pages filled with “generic information” 
such as the investigating officer’s name and qualifications.32 The surveillance 
of the property showed only an individual “walking away from the area of 
the Residence and then leaving that area in a car”—without any evidence 
that the individual purchased drugs from the residence (or even went into 
the residence).33 There were no details offered regarding the “veracity or re-
liability” of the informant.34 And the suspect’s criminal history showed only 
minor possession offenses, with the most recent occurring several years pri-
or.35 These defects, though, did not trouble the majority. Although it 
acknowledged that there were “possible contradiction[s]” to the warrant, it 
attributed such shortcomings to the “haste of a criminal investigation” and 
 
Nears His Benchmark, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06
/18/us/mcconnell-courts-justin-walker.html [https://perma.cc/G7J6-64FZ]. 
 26. Sam Berger, Conservative Court Packing, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 3, 2019, 9:01 
AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/news/2019/04/03/468234/conserv
ative-court-packing/ [https://perma.cc/8R7A-YSAP]. 
 27. Flipping Circuit Courts, SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM. (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/flipping-circuit-courts [https://perma.cc/P7WS-
52HM]. 
 28. 925 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 
 29. Christian, 925 F.3d at 311. 
 30. Id. at 308. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 329 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
 33. Id. at 321. 
 34. Id. at 322. 
 35. Id. at 327. 
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concluded, under the “totality of the circumstances,” that it should “defer[]” 
to the judgment of the officers on the scene.36 
The vote in Christian was eleven to seven—a straight party-line vote, 
with all six of President Trump’s appointments joining the majority.37 The 
opinion’s implications are troubling. If every aspect of a search warrant is 
defective, it is difficult to see how viewing the warrant in its “totality” can 
transmogrify it into something that passes constitutional muster. By exten-
sion, it is hard to understand how probable cause can, post-Christian, still 
serve as a meaningful check on government power. 
Even courts that have not formally flipped have been impacted by com-
positional changes. Although Democratic appointees continue to slightly 
outnumber Republican appointees in the Ninth Circuit, members of the 
court have become increasingly “reluctant to ask for 11-judge panels to re-
view conservative decisions because the larger en banc panels, chosen ran-
domly, might be dominated by Republicans.”38 That is, in fact, what hap-
happened in California v. Azar.39 The court, sitting en banc, upheld a federal 
regulation—known as the “gag rule”—which prevented health care providers 
from referring patients to abortion providers.40 The decision was seven to 
four, with two Trump appointees (Judges Eric Miller and Kenneth Lee) 
comprising the swing votes.41 
Christian and Azar highlight different aspects of the trends described 
above. Christian did not, for one, create a circuit split. It involved judges as-
sessing a variety of facts and factors and viewing them through the “totality 
of the circumstances”—the very sort of balancing test that devolves power to 
circuit courts and discourages Supreme Court review. And, unsurprisingly, 
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Christian.42 Similarly, Azar did not 
establish a discrete split in authority. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 
the rule will nevertheless—given the court’s size—affect nearly one-fifth of 
the U.S. population.43 Plaintiffs in Azar did not petition for certiorari, thus 
precluding a change in interpretation for the foreseeable future. 
 
 36. Id. at 309–10 (majority opinion) (quoting Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 
(2013), and Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983)). 
 37. Id. at 306. 
 38. Maura Dolan, Trump Has Flipped the 9th Circuit—And Some New Judges Are Caus-
ing a ‘Shock Wave’, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2020, 7:06 AM), https://www.latimes.com
/california/story/2020-02-22/trump-conservative-judges-9th-circuit (on file with Michigan 
Law Review). In most courts, sitting en banc means that a case is reheard in front of all of the 
judges of the court. However, given the Ninth Circuit’s size, that can be logistically challenging. 
Accordingly, an en banc panel is formed by the Chief Judge and ten randomly drawn circuit 
judges. 
 39. 950 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc). 
 40. Azar, 950 F.3d at 1068, 1104–05. 
 41. Id. at 1068. 
 42. Christian v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 414 (2019) (mem.). 
 43. Hearing on Oversight of the Structure of the Federal Courts Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rts. & Fed. Cts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 
38 Michigan Law Review Online [Vol. 119:32 
The foregoing is not meant as a criticism of Supreme Court practice. 
There may be good reasons to permit legal divisions to percolate, be it 
through discrete or more subtle circuit splits. As Justice Felix Frankfurter 
once observed, “[i]t may be desirable to have different aspects of an issue 
further illumined by the lower courts. Wise adjudication has its own time for 
ripening.”44 My point is more descriptive. The law is interpreted, often de-
finitively, by the circuit courts—shining a light on their importance. 
II. WHY SHOULD WE INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CIRCUIT JUDGES? 
The Constitution vests Congress with the power to both establish federal 
circuit courts and expand the number of authorized circuit judgeships.45 As 
a foundational, commonsense principle, the number of authorized circuit 
judgeships should grow as the country grows. More people equals more dis-
putes equals more judges needed to adjudicate those disputes. To illustrate 
this point from a historical perspective, I constructed a dataset comparing 
the total number of authorized judgeships against the U.S. population, from 
1869 (when the circuit courts were created) to the present.46 My findings are 
below.47  
The history of circuit-judge growth can be organized across four eras. 
The first, beginning in 1869 and lasting to 1970, saw a steady increase in the 
number of circuit judges. During this era, growth in circuit judges mirrored 
 
7 (2018) (written testimony of J. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/07-31-18%20O'Scannlain%20Testimony.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9WKM-DR8R]. 
 44. Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950). 
 45. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time estab-
lish.” (emphasis added)). 
 46. Some may consider population too crude a measure and argue instead for an exam-
ination of the total number of cases filed. But that position faces two constraints. One, there is 
little historical data on caseloads, making a longitudinal analysis impossible. And two, appeals 
do not necessarily track the number of cases filed in federal district court. Many immigration 
cases, for instance, start with a hearing before an immigration judge and jump directly to fed-
eral circuit court, without going through district court. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
 47. For judicial data, see Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships in U.S. Court of 
Appeals, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/appealschronol.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/HRN2-CRWE]. For population data, see National Population Totals and Compo-
nents of Change: 2010–2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.census
.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-national-total.html [https://perma.cc/T5JE-
QAB4] (for data from 2010 to 2019); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2000-2009/state/totals/ [https://
perma.cc/38Y2-HS8Y] (for data from 2000 to 2009); Historical National Population Estimates: 
July 1, 1900 to July 1, 1999, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 11, 2000), https://www2.census.gov
/programs-surveys/popest/tables/1900-1980/national/totals/popclockest.txt [https://perma
.cc/2GCH-9U2A] (for data from 1901 to 1999); and BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COM., HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 8 (1975), 
https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/histstats-colonial-1970.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA3A-
WWVA] (for data from 1869 to 1900). 
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that of the population as a whole—as the country grew, the number of circuit 
judges increased too. 
Beginning in 1970 and extending through 1980, a disparity between the 
number of authorized judgeships and the growth of the country emerged. 
While the country continued to grow, the number of circuit judges stagnat-
ed. Congress closed this gap in 1978 with Public Law 95-486.48 Passed under 
President Jimmy Carter, the law increased the number of authorized circuit 
judgeships and effectively ensured that growth in circuit judges caught up 




But the changes made by Public Law 95-486 were outpaced in the era 
that followed, from 1980 to 1992. In this period, taking place during the 
Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush Presidencies, the number of circuit 
judges jumped by 40 percent, far outpacing overall population growth. 
In the final era, no new circuit judgeships have been added since 1991. 
However, because of the dramatic rise in judges during the preceding era, 
population growth did not catch up to and outpace growth in circuit judges 
until about ten years ago.50 Yet since then, the U.S. population has continued 
 
 48. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (providing for the appoint-
ment of additional district and circuit judges). 
 49. See id. 
 50. Between 2008 and 2009, one judgeship from the D.C. Circuit was transferred to the 
Ninth Circuit, but the overall total remained the same. Court Security Improvement Act of 
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40 Michigan Law Review Online [Vol. 119:32 
to grow, while the number of circuit judges has remained constant—creating 
a concomitant deficit in judicial resources at the appellate level. 
There are two potential challenges to the foregoing analysis. First, while 
the ratio of circuit judges to population has decreased in recent years, the 
gap today is not as glaring as it has been in the past—for example, in the 
1920s and 1930s. And second, the above dataset looks only at the number of 
authorized circuit judgeships without considering the workload of senior 
circuit judges. 
The first critique highlights a valid shortcoming in the data. Namely, 
although examining the empirical relationship between population and au-
thorized judgeships serves as a helpful indicator of judicial capacity and the 
corresponding need for judicial resources, this relationship alone does not 
fully account for increases in legal complexity. On this point, most law stu-
dents, clerks, and practitioners agree: the law is complex, and seems to be-
come more and more complex each year. The rise of the administrative state, 
the proliferation of technology, and the expansion of federal criminal juris-
diction all contribute to this intuitive understanding. Emerging empirical re-
search appears to confirm that, in the past several decades, our legal systems, 
codes, and cases have become significantly more complex.51 Put another 
way, litigating an immigration case in 2020 is very different from litigating 
an immigration case in 1920, given the increase in the number of adminis-
trative rules, the growing overlap of immigration with other areas of law, and 
the frequent shifts in executive action in the field.52 
Indeed, Congress seems to have implicitly acknowledged this rise in 
complexity by significantly increasing the number of district court judges—
that is, the trial court judges that generally review a lawsuit in the first in-
stance. Since 1990, Congress has authorized eighty-eight new district judge-
ships through a series of increases that occurred under both Democratic and 
Republican presidential administrations.53 Such actions allow district courts 
to handle more total cases or, as discussed above, more complex cases. Un-
der such circumstances, a corresponding increase in the number of circuit 
judges seems well warranted—increased district court capacity would, by ex-
 
 51. See generally J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing 
Legal Complexity, 101 IOWA L. REV. 191, 195–97 (2015) (describing ways to measure increas-
ing complexity of Tax Code); Paul Lippe, Daniel Martin Katz & Dan Jackson, Legal by Design: 
A New Paradigm for Handling Complexity in Banking Regulation and Elsewhere in Law, 93 OR. 
L. REV. 833, 836 (2015) (observing “the exponential rise of legal complexity”); Peter H. Schuck, 
Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1992) (“The legal 
system as a whole exhibits a marked tendency to become more complex . . . .”). 
 52. Garcia v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 168 F. Supp. 3d 50, 54 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(“[O]ur Byzantine immigration laws and administrative regulations are second or third in 
complexity [only] to the Internal Revenue Code.” (quoting Santiago v. Holder, 312 F. App’x 
867, 868 (9th Cir. 2009) (Pregerson, J. dissenting))). 
 53. See U.S. District Courts: Additional Authorized Judgeships, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/districtauth.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CWG-44DU] 
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tension, almost certainly result in an increased demand for appellate case re-
view.54 
This conclusion dovetails with the second critique described above: 
whether, given this increase in demand, senior judges can address the deficit 
in judicial resources at the circuit court level. To be sure, there is little doubt 
that senior circuit judges “are critical to the federal Judiciary” since, 
“[w]ithout senior judges, some appellate courts would face ‘a disastrous 
build-up of backlogs,’ ‘severe[]’ problems ‘administer[ing] justice in a timely 
fashion,’ or even a ‘total breakdown in the trial of civil cases.’ ”55 But senior 
judges are at best a partial solution to a much larger problem. First, as a legal 
matter, there are serious questions as to whether senior judges are unconsti-
tutional; at the very least, their status raises serious constitutional questions 
regarding the Appointments Clause.56 Second, senior circuit judges generally 
cannot hear en banc cases—which, as noted above, are often complex, wide-
ranging in scope, and critically important to shaping the law of a circuit.57 
Third, senior circuit judges may choose how many and what types of cases 
they want to hear—and most such judges do not carry a full caseload (or an-
ywhere close).58 Hence, although senior judges represent about 40 percent of 
the federal judiciary, they oversee only about 15 percent of the total federal 
docket.59 
The data bears these points out: notwithstanding the presence of senior 
circuit judges, the recent failure to grow the number of active, authorized 
circuit judgeships has significantly hampered the administration of justice. 
The emerging caseload crisis has been well chronicled.60 Excluding the Fed-
eral Circuit, there has been a 21 percent increase in the number of cases filed, 
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terminated, and pending in the circuit courts between 1990 and 2019.61 That 
has led to several negative ramifications. Bert Huang, for instance, has found 
that, because of a surge in cases in the Second and Ninth Circuits, these Cir-
cuits “began to reverse district court rulings less often.”62 These Circuits en-
gaged in “lightened scrutiny” of district courts—in other words, they were 
no longer doing their job (or doing their job as rigorously).63 Other legal 
commentators similarly acknowledge that “the federal bench is long overdue 
for a comprehensive judgeship bill” because, “[d]espite the explosive growth 
in federal district and appellate caseloads over the years,” there has been “no 
increase in appellate court judgeships” for decades.64 
There are, in short, meaningful nonpartisan reasons to increase federal 
circuit judgeships. Absent an influx of judicial resources, everyone suffers: 
circuit judges find it harder to do their job, district judges are subject to less 
scrutiny, and litigants are deprived of a fair forum of review.65 
III. HOW SHOULD WE INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CIRCUIT JUDGES? 
Before addressing how to increase the number of circuit judges, two 
points are worth noting. First, expanding the number of circuit judges is far 
more feasible than packing the Supreme Court. The last time court-packing 
for the Supreme Court was seriously contemplated was, famously, by Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s.66 But President Roosevelt’s plan was 
defeated—not just because of the Court’s “switch in time,” but also because 
“from the moment it was announced,” political resistance to Roosevelt’s plan 
was “vehement, geographically widespread, and bipartisan.”67 As Richard 
Pildes observes, “FDR’s legislative assault on the Court destroyed his politi-
cal coalition, in Congress and nationally, and ended his ability to enact ma-
jor domestic policy legislation, despite his huge electoral triumph in 1936.”68 
Consequently, “[i]n the near century since, court-packing has been treated as 
a political third rail—making the Court’s current size look like an en-
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 63. Id. at 1115. 
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https://archive.thinkprogress.org/uploads/2017/11/calabresi-court-packing-memo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E4QF-5ZX4]. 
 65. See, e.g., Huang, supra note 62, at 1145 (“Persistent imbalance in judicial burdens 
across circuits creates a perplexing problem, [including] the inequality of forcing some courts 
to do more with less[] and the consequent risk that litigants in those courts might have a hard-
er time winning an appeal.”). 
 66. See, e.g., Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 3, at 153. 
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trenched, quasiconstitutional norm.”69 In 1869, there were nine Supreme 
Court Justices.70 There remain nine today. But there is no corresponding 
norm for circuit judges. In 1869, there were nine circuit judges.71 Today 
there are 179, an increase of around one per year.72 
Second, increasing the number of circuit judges in the near future is like-
ly inevitable, a fact recognized by actors from both parties. Republican Con-
gressmen have regularly called to either split and/or increase the number of 
judgeships in the Ninth Circuit to accommodate for the increase in legal 
claims.73 In addition to these proposals, in 2008 and 2013, Democratic Sena-
tor Patrick Leahy introduced bills to add twelve and five circuit court seats, 
respectively.74 In 2017, the Federal Judicial Conference recommended add-
ing five circuit court seats.75 The relevant question is not whether Congress 
will increase the number of circuit judges. It is when, where, and by how 
much. 
Answering this last question—how much—may be a political landmine. 
A core anxiety is that the parties will engage in an arms race: Democrats in-
crease in Phase One, Republicans increase in Phase Two, Democrats retaliate 
in Phase Three, and so forth.76 To avoid such a result, Congress might con-
sider the following: (1) a one-time increase, (2) followed by annual single-
judge increases. 
On (1), there is no perfect solution for how large any one-time increase 
should be. On one end, Steven Calabresi and Shams Hirji previously pro-
posed adding between 61 and 262 circuit judgeships, in a direct effort to 
“undo[] President Barack Obama’s judicial legacy.”77 That proposal was crit-
icized as unserious and risibly partisan from both sides of the political aisle.78 
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A similar uproar would presumably ensue if Democrats proposed a one-time 
increase of 53 circuit judges to offset President Trump’s judicial legacy. 
A historical perspective could help. As noted, the number of circuit 
judges has grown on average by about one per year—but all growth ceased in 
1991.79 To make up for lost time, the next president could, in 2021, seek a 
one-time increase of thirty additional circuit judgeships. Alternatively, Con-
gress could pass a judgeship bill combining the recommendations from re-
cent legislation: twelve circuit judges proposed in 2008 by the Senate, five in 
2013 by the Senate, and five in 2017 by the Federal Judicial Conference—for 
twenty-two judgeships total.80 These numbers are germs for thought, not 
full-service prescriptions. The final number added at any one time must 
leave room for and reflect the realities of political negotiation. 
On (2), I selected a continual, one-judge increase because that number 
approximates both average historical growth in the number of judges and 
U.S. population growth (between 0.48 and 0.73% over the past five years, 
which equates to between 0.9 and 1.3 judges per year).81 Continually increas-
ing the number of circuit judges provides an automated mechanism to ad-
dress future caseload increases. 
Such a mechanism also has the added benefit of conferring democratic 
legitimacy on the Judiciary. Allowing a popularly elected president an addi-
tional opportunity to name circuit judges during his or her tenure creates 
more democratic accountability within the judicial branch: that is, when my 
party wins, I get to appoint more judges; and when your party wins, you get 
to appoint more judges. That feature may help deflect commonly invoked 
critiques of judicial countermajoritarianism.82 
For both (1) and (2), political actors must also address where the new 
circuit judgeships are created. A neutral proposal could apportion judgeships 
based on increases in caseload or population. On the other hand, a more po-
litically conscious proposal could allow for bargaining, where some seats are 
accorded based on sociopolitical considerations while others are allocated 
based on population. Leaving this question open provides necessary room 
for negotiation between the parties. 
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So much attention has been paid to the makeup of the Supreme Court. 
But that focus obscures the importance of the federal circuit courts. These 
courts matter a great deal. They are the “super-appellate” courts that can ad-
dress issues and correct errors in ways the Supreme Court cannot. Both par-
ties have, over time, increased the number of circuit judges to meet rising 
demand for judicial resources. Given the stagnation during the past thirty 
years, it appears ripe to increase that number again. On this score, a trans-
parently partisan proposal could lead to undesirable knock-on effects. An 
approach that instead provides a one-time increase, followed by single-judge 
increases each following year, might represent an enduring solution for all 
actors. 
